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Abstract- For over a decade now, violent conflict has been a 
recurring decimal in Plateau State, most especially in Jos the 
state capital. However, some commentators have examined 
the simmering conflicts in Jos by adopting mono-causal 
perspective. Anchored on eclectic model of conflict analysis 
and with heavy reliance on secondary data, this study 
examined violent conflict in Jos. The study found that conflicts 
in Jos and elsewhere are caused by confluence of factors and 
as such solutions to conflict should embrace the various 
manifestations of conflict so as to proffer workable solutions. 
Keywords: ethnicity, violence, conflict, jos. 
I. Introduction 
or some years now Plateau State has been a 
theatre of violent conflict. Over the past decade, at 
least 4,000 people have been killed in Jos and 
smaller cities and villages in Plateau State (Krause, 
2011). There has been extensive damage of property, 
and violent conflicts in the state have taken toll on its 
developmental prospects. But Jos, the state capital 
appears to be the epicenter of much of insecurity and 
the worst site of violence in the state (Higazi, 2011). 
Episode of mass killing and destruction of lives and 
property seems to have started from 2001 and 
continued to 2010 according to (Higazi, 2011) but after 
2010 there have been quite a number of episodic 
violence till date.  
In the literature, ethnicity and indigene/settler 
phenomenon (see Best, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 
2006) are often seen as central to violence in the state 
once known as home of " peace and tourism"  that has 
now become the centre of violent conflict. Still few 
others like the former Governor of Plateau State, late 
Solomon Lar (cited in Suleiman, 2011) disagreed with 
the above assertion by saying politics is the cause of 
conflict in the region. Some commentators like Philip 
Dafe Chairman, Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) 
(cited in Adi (2011) see religion as the driver of conflict in 
the region as people that are often victims of violent 
conflict in Jos and other parts of the state are people 
that have nothing to do with the politics of Jos but 
Christians. The position of this paper is that, instead of 
viewing the aforementioned factors singly as cause of 
conflict, it is better to treat them holistically as one factor 
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reinforces the other and the fact that mono-causal 
approach to conflict analysis is inadequate. 
For analytical purposes, this study is divided into 
the following segments: section one introduces the 
study; section two focuses on conceptualization of the 
key concepts and theoretical framework; the next 
section is on the geography of the study area and also 
an overview of conflict in the region; the next section 
immediately after this discusses etiology of violent 
conflicts in Jos, and its implications. The last section is 
on conclusion and recommendations.   
II. Conceptual Premise 
a) On Ethnicity  
Ethnicity according to Nnoli (1978:5) simply 
means a social phenomenon associated with 
interacttions among members of different ethnic groups. 
He further held that ethnic groups are social formations 
distinguished by communal character (i.e. language and 
culture) of their boundaries. In the same vein, Otite 
(1989:2 cited in Egwu, 1998:56) defined the concept as 
the contextual discrimination by members of one group 
against others on the basis of differentiated systems of 
socio-cultural symbols. According to Nnoli (1989) there 
are four major attributes of ethnicity: first, it exists in a 
polity in which there is a variety of ethnic groups; 
second, it is characterized by exclusiveness which is 
manifested in inter-ethnic discrimination; third, conflict is 
inherent particularly in situations of strong competition 
over limited resources; finally ethnicity involves 
consciousness of being one in relation to other ethnic 
groups. 
b) On Violence 
The concept of violence serves as a catch all for 
every variety of protest, militancy, coercion, destruction, 
or muscle flexing which a given observer happens to 
fear or condemn (Tilly, 1974 cited in Joshua and Oni, 
2010). To Anifowose (2011) in order to properly 
conceptualize violence, it is necessary to distinguish it 
from force. Force means legal and legitimate use of 
violence by a government so as to protect the state, 
while violence carries an overtone of “violating” that is 
illegitimate use of force by non-governmental individuals 
and groups. However, in the context of this study, 
extrapolating from Anifowose (2011) violence is defined 
as the use or threat of physical act carried out by an 
individual(s) or a group of people within a geographical 
enclave against another individual(s) or a group of 
people and or property, with the intent to cause injury or 
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death to person(s) and/ or damage or destruction to 
property. 
c) On Conflict 
The word conflict is taken from the Latin word 
“conflictus” meaning “struck together”. Conflict means 
clash, contention, confrontation, a battle or struggle, 
controversy or quarrel (Nwolise, 1997:28 cited in 
Joshua, 2013:33). To " Coser (1956 cited in Joshua, 
2013:33)“ conflict is a struggle over values and claims 
over status, power and resources in which the aims of 
the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their 
rivals. 
Conflict is coterminous with violence but may 
not necessarily mean the same. Conflict may or may not 
be occasioned with destruction of lives and properties. 
Conflict that is destructive is termed violent conflict. 
However, if dispute, quarrel or misunderstanding 
between people or group is not occasioned with threat 
or actual destruction of lives and properties it is non-
violent conflict. 
Studies have revealed that proximate groups 
are often prone to conflict. Little wonder that Hewstone, 
et. al (2008) posited that groups in proximity are groups 
in conflict. This is because neighbouring groups are 
likely to be competitors for scarce resources such as; 
land, or may be victimized because they posses wealth 
that can be conveniently confiscated (Glick, 2008). The 
nexus of the tripartite concepts (ethnicity, violence and 
conflict) can be seen in the sense that, differences in 
ethnic groupings may not necessarily results in violent 
conflict if there is no competition for scarce resources 
and values which could be material, political or socio-
cultural in nature among the proximate groups. In other 
words, conflict between or among groups may be 
triggered by confluence of factors. It is therefore not a 
surprise that Osita (2007) asserted that any engagement 
with conflict phenomenon in the present day Nigeria 
must as a matter of necessity grapple with the multiple 
impacts of the complex nexus among which are: history, 
economic, political, cultural, religion and psycho-social 
dimensions of conflict. 
III. Theoretical Exposition 
 
 
The central argument of eclectic model is that 
civil conflicts are precipitated and sustained by 
confluence of factors which include:
 
cultural, economic, 
historical, political and social among others which 
requires a combination of multiple theoretical 
approaches so as to arrive at acceptable explanations 
(Sanderson, 1987). Eclecticism holds that any particular 
problem must be explained
 
from different angles so as 
to bring to bear diversity of approaches. The importance 
of this approach is premised on the fact that each 
approach only provides partial insight into the nature of 
problem, whereas the combination of approaches gives 
complete
 
picture of the problem (Sanderson, 1087). By 
application to Jos case, eclecticism will bring to the fore 
the multiplicity of factors responsible for conflicts in the 
region. The strength of this model is seen in its 
comprehensiveness and inclusiveness in providing the 
basis for the analysis of multifactor etiology of conflict. 
 
IV.
 
Geography of the Study Area
 
Plateau State is located in the North-Central 
zone of Nigeria and forms part of the middle-belt 
(Higazi, 2011). Jos is the administrative capital of 
Plateau State and is located in the North-East zone of 
the country (Onuoha, et. al, 2010). Scholars like Best 
(2007:4) noted that Plateau State is one of the most 
diverse states in the Nigerian federation. The region 
hosts a high concentration of relatively small ethnic 
communities with over 40 languages (Blench, 2009:2). 
The major ethnic groups in Jos are the: Berom, 
Anaguta, and Afizere regarded as indigene groups in 
Jos and are predominantly Christians; other groups 
which are often referred to as settlers are the Yoruba, 
Igbo and the Hausa/Fulani. The Hausa/Fulani group 
referrers to themselves as Jasawa (people of Jos) to 
distinguish them from the Hausa/Fulani in other states of 
the Nigerian federation (Krause, 2011).
 
 Having taken a purview of the study area, it is 
important to note that violent conflicts in the region is 
mostly limited
 
to the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani 
population with other ethnic groups in the region being 
victims most especially when crisis turns religious. What 
account for this development is not far-fetched from the 
fact that, while other ethnic groups in the region apart 
from the Hausa/Fulani see the
 
mselves as settlers and 
they never contested for ownership of Jos, the Hausa/ 
Fulani claim that they are indigenes and should be 
treated as such as a result of their long stay in the Jos.
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Oberschall (2010 cited in Joshua, 2013) argued 
that no single theoretical framework can be expected to 
encompass conflict. In the same vein, Akanji (2005)
postulated that it is now generally accepted in the 
conflict literature that conflict is illusive. Consequently, 
the position taken in this paper study is that a mono-
factor based explanation of conflict is inadequate for 
understanding conflict in Jos, Plateau State and as such 
eclectic model of conflict analysis is adopted in 
analyzing conflict in the region.
Going by the Nigerian census of 2006, Plateau 
State had as at then a total population of 3, 178, 712 
(Nigerian Census, 2006). The state has 17 Local 
Government Areas. Jos, the state capital is divided into 
three Local Government Areas; Jos North, Jos South 
and Jos East. Krause (2011) noted that according to 
2006 Nigerian Population Census, Jos North had as at 
then, a population of 429,300 people; Jos South 
306,716 and Jos East 85, 603.
The next section focuses on an overview of 
conflicts in Jos.
 
 
 
 
V.
 
Violent Conflicts in JOS : An 
Overview 
Jos the state capital of Plateau State has 
witnessed violent conflicts of differing dimensions in 
1994, 2001, 2004, 2008 and the last major crisis being 
that of January 17 and March 7, 2010 (Onuoha, et al, 
2010). But since then (2010) there have been cases
 
of 
secret killings and night ambushes in different in parts of 
the state and casualties have been on both sides (the 
indigenes and Hausa/Fulani). Countless churches and 
Mosques have been razed, and hundreds of lives lost to 
the crisis (Suleiman, 2011). 
 
Few cases of violent conflicts in Jos are 
examined below. The first major conflicts in Jos was in 
1994 when the indigenes and Hausa/Fulani group 
engaged in violent confrontation over the appointment 
of a Hausa candidate to chair the Jos North Local 
Government Council which was created in 1991 by the 
military government of Babangida. It is believed that the 
military regime created the Jos Local Government to 
satisfy the interest of the Hausa/Fulani population in Jos 
North. The violence immediately took on ethnic and 
religious colouration (Sulieman, 2011). In 1998, a small 
incident between a Berom and Hausa man degenerated 
into what became known as the Bukuru Gyero road 
fracas, leading to violence, destruction of property and 
loss of lives (Egwu, 2004). In fact, Onuoha, et al (2010) 
noted that between 2001 and 2004 there were about 63 
conflicts with ethno-religious undertones around Jos 
and other parts of Plateau State.  In September 10, 
2001, it was alleged that some Huasas/Fulanis attacked 
Barakin Ladi Local Government Area and killed 12 
people. On February 24, 2004 another violent conflict 
engulfed the area in which about 150 houses were burnt 
and over 265 people killed. The next one was in Yelwa 
on May 3rd, 2004 which culminated in the declaration of 
a state of emergency in the state. It is chagrin that 
despite the declaration of a state of emergency on the 
May 18th, 2004, violence was still being perpetrated.
 
In November 2008, local government elections 
were conducted across Plateau State. However, the 
conduct of the election in Jos North and the dispute 
over the results gave vigor to a renewed mass violence 
in Jos, leading to the death of over 700 people within 
two days (Higazi, 2011). Before the army and mobile 
police quelled the violence, houses and other properties 
were destroyed in the affected areas and churches and 
mosques were torched (Higazi, 2011). 
 
On Sunday 17, January 2010, another round of 
bloody violence broke out in Jos. The remote cause was 
attributed to the desire to retaliate based on what some 
parties had suffered during the November 2008 
bloodbath. It was indeed, a reprisal attack. The 
immediate cause was connected to a man who had 
returned to rebuild his home and was prevented and 
subsequently attacked (Onuoha et al, 2010). The crisis 
started at Jos Jarawa area of Fraka district, near Dutse 
Uku and later spread to Angwan Rogo, Bauchi road, 
Angwan Rukwuba and later to Jos South.  At least 300 
lives were lost and thousand wounded (Thisday, 2010; 
Gofwen, 2011).
 On March 7, 2010, Jos was rocked again by 
violent conflict in which hundreds of Fulani herdsmen 
were said to have invaded three Christian villages of 
Dogo Nahawa, Ratsat and Zot at midnight. Not less 
than 500 people were killed in the attack who were 
mostly women, children and elderly. The attack was 
interpreted as a reprisal by Hausa/Fulani ethnic group 
over the January 2010 incident which was claimed to 
have led to the massacre of many Hausa/Fulani 
Moslems (Onuoha et al, 2010).
 2011 was a particular bloody year. The people 
that were killed in the first six months runs into 
hundreds. In fact, between 15 August and 12 
September, more than 150 peoples lost their lives, with 
about 50 records in a week. Victims of the gruesome 
killings included pregnant women, children and an entire 
family. The sudden upsurge of violence in this particular 
period was also accompanied with regular “silent killing” 
(ICG, 2012).
 The city of Jos was rocked with three suicide 
bombings between December 2011 and March 2012 
which Boko Haram was suspected to have 
orchestrated. The first on Christmas Day 2011, claimed 
about fifty lives mostly in churches as churches were 
targeted in the attack (ICG, 2012).
 Having given a purview of cases of violent 
conflicts in Jos, the next section discussed causes of 
violence in the region.
 
VI.
 
Etiology of Violent Conflicts in 
JOS
 
Some of the factors identified as causes of 
conflicts in the region are remote and proximate. 
However, most of the causes identified reinforce one 
another. As noted by Best (2007) the Fulani attribute 
causes of conflict in the area to ethnicity, religion and 
their economic prosperity reflecting in the large herd of 
cattle they have which made them object of envy to the 
indigenes. The indigenes argued that they do not envy 
the Fulanis and that conflict between them often 
cropped up when their cows (the Fulani cows) 
destroyed their (indigenes) crops. But the Yorubas in the 
area view the conflicts as been politically motivated by 
the politicians in the area. Some of these factors are 
discussed below.
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VII. Dispute over Ownership of JO S 
The Hausa argued that they established Jos, 
and that it was nurtured by them till it become a modern 
city without any help from any of the indigenous ethnic 
groups in Jos. A leader of the Hausa/Fulani community 
in Jos was quoted to have said: 
Historically, Jos is a Hausa settlement and this 
had been confirmed by Mr. Ames, a colonial 
Administrator who gave the population of Jos town in 
1950 as 10,207, out of which 10,000 people were of 
Hausa/Fulani origin. Before the arrival of the British, the 
present location of Jos was a virgin land and the 
situation as could be seen today shows no 
concentration of Berom or any of the tribes in the 
neighbourhood as being seen in the heartland of Jos 
town (Best, 2007:24).  
The Hausa also claimed that the naming of 
major streets and areas in Jos (Abba Na Shebu, Garba 
Daho, Sarkin Arab and so on) with Hausa names and 
the fact that they had produced a total of eleven Hausa 
Chiefs who ruled Jos up to 1947 authenticate their 
claims. Thus, having founded and ruled Jos, they 
cannot be considered as aliens and settlers (Best, 
2007). 
The indigenes debunked these claims by 
saying that they were never conquered by the Fulani 
Jihadists following the Usman Dan Fodio Jihad policy; 
and that the Hausa settlers came to Jos after the British 
conquest of the area to work in tin mining industry and 
were never indigenes. It was after they had settled they 
re-named those streets in Hausa name (Best, 2007).  
VIII. Ethnicity 
The heterogeneous nature of Jos and Plateau 
State in general has been identified as a key factor to 
the conflicts in the area. Aside this, lines of ethnic 
identity quite frequently do coincide with religious 
affiliation. While the indigenes are mostly Christians, the 
Hausa/Fulani are predominantly Moslems. Which is why 
conflict between the two groups is often seen as 
religious (Onuoha et al, 2010). 
IX. Political Factors 
The balkanization of Jos Local Government 
Area in 1991 into Jos North and South (while Krause, 
2011 said it was divided into Jos North, South and East) 
by the Babangida’s military regime has often been used 
as a sad commentary in respect of Jos crisis. This is 
because the exercise gave the Hausa/Fulani group 
numerical domination in Jos North. Throughout the 
period of military regime Huasa/Fulani extraction was 
always appointed to chair the Local Government, a 
development that pitched the Hausa/Fulani population 
against the indigenes. A more direct link to this was 
when local government election in November 2008 
sparked violence in Jos North Local Government on the 
claim by the Hausa/Fulani that Jang’s administration 
planned to rig the election in favour of his cousin, a 
Berom who contested on the platform of the Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP) (Suleiman, 2011). Added to this 
is the fact that, the Hausa/Fulani group does not feel 
represented in the government of Jang’s, the present 
governor of Plateau State (ICG, 2012).  
X. Religion 
Philip Dafes (the Chairman of the Christian 
Association of Nigeria Plateau State Chapter cited in 
Adi, 2011 before and Suleiman, 2011) is of the opinion 
that that violence in Jos is more of religion in the sense 
that there has been no political party office burnt or 
destroyed in the crisis but several religious worship 
centers have been razed. Best (2007) also noted that for 
the Christian leaders in Plateau state, the Jos conflict is 
seen as primarily religious. They view the conflict as a 
campaign to forcefully bring down Christianity in other to 
impose Islam on the people of Plateau State. In the 
same vein, HRW (2009) noted that in November 2008 
crisis; forty-six churches were vandalized and set ablaze 
with a number of clergies killed. This is in line with the 
trend of thought of Suleiman (2011) that blockage of 
roads during worship and indiscriminate use of 
speakers among others accentuates violent conflicts in 
the area. 
XI. Youth Unemployment 
ICG (2012) noted that lack of opportunities and 
growing rate of unemployment among youth, especially 
from the late 1980s, have aggravated tensions in Jos 
and the rest of the country. Onuoha et al, (2010) equally 
aligned with this argument that high level of poverty, 
unemployment and underemployment, especially 
among youth is a contributory factor to the outbreak of 
violent conflicts not only in Jos, but Nigeria in general 
even though the figure of unemployment in Jos is not 
available. 
XII. Efforts at Resolution 
Since April 1994, quite a number of 
commissions of inquiry have been set up to investigate 
the remote and immediate causes of violent conflict in 
Jos. They are: Justice Aribiton Fiberesima Judicial 
Commission of inquiry into the April 1994 crisis; Justice 
Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the 
September 2010 crisis; Presidential Peace Initiative 
Committee on Plateau State, headed by Shehu Idris of 
Zazzau, May 2004; Plateau Peace Conference (“Plateau 
Resolves”) 18 August-21 September, 2004; and 
Presidential Advisory Committee on the Jos crisis, 
March-April 2010 (ICG, 2012). 
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Apart from the peace initiative mentioned 
above, government has also deployed the Joint Task 
Force (JTF), and the police to stem the tide of killings in 
the region. The efforts of the military Task Force has 
however been undermined by deep-rooted mutual 
ethnic and religious suspicion between the combatants 
as the members of the JTF on assignment in the region 
that are Hausas/Fulani are seen as taken side with the 
suspected Fulani herdsmen attacking the indigenous 
tribe. This is because Fulani herdsmen attacks on the 
indigenous tribes were said to have taken place close to 
the position of the JTF without such attacks been 
prevented (Suleiman, 2011). 
In addition, ICG (2012) observed that the 
inability of government to stop the spiral of violence is 
predicated on the fact that, whenever violence broke 
out, government always made tough speeches which 
are not followed with corresponding political action 
against the perpetrators of inter-communal violence, 
even after they have been identified by security, 
intelligence agencies and the local communities. It was 
observed that some of the people alleged as 
perpetrators of 2008 crisis were released shortly after 
arrest. The security agencies hardly inquire about 
persons alleged of making inflammatory, inciting and 
provocative speeches. In other words, there seems to 
be little or no deterrence and disincentive to check the 
recklessness and impunity of perpetrators of violence.  
XIII. Implications of Violent Conflicts 
in JOS  
Violent conflicts in Jos have wide range 
implications. It has led to destruction of lives, properties 
and social life. For instance, former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo in justifying the declaration of the state of 
emergency in Plateau State stated among others that: 
Violence has reached unprecedented levels and 
hundreds have been killed with much more wounded or 
displaced from their homes on account of their ethnic 
religious identification. School for children has been 
disrupted and interrupted; businesses have lost billions 
of naira and property worth much more destroyed 
(Obasanjo, 2004 cited in Mohammed, 2005:4). 
Obasanjo (2004 cited in Mohammed, 2005:4) 
equally observed that visitors and investors have fled or 
are fleeing Plateau State leading to influx of internally 
displace persons into neighbouring states with 
implication for disruption and dislocation of their 
economies. This development has made the Federal 
Government and the neighbouring states incurred huge 
expenses in the management of the socio-political and 
economic consequences brought about by the near 
collapse of the state authority and the breakdown of law 
and order in Jos and some parts of Plateau State. 
Similarly, Mohammed (2005) also submitted 
that, crisis in Jos and other parts of the state has led to 
the killing and burning of a large number of livestock, 
residential building and places of worship. He equally 
added that Jos market that was built with about two 
million naira in the late 70s was razed down in one of the 
crises.
 
XIV.
 
Conclusion and Recommendations
 
It appears from the analysis above that mono-
causal approach to conflict analysis using Jos as a focal 
point of study is inadequate. This is because conflicts in 
the region and elsewhere are often caused by 
confluence of factors. In view of this submission, 
solutions to violent conflict in Jos and elsewhere should 
equally encapsulate the various manifestations of 
conflict. Based on this informed position, some 
suggestions are made. The rationale for the suggestions 
is predicated on the fact that “… it is an intellectual 
obligation not only to analyze the problems of society 
but also to proffer solutions” (Gboyega, 2003 cited in 
Joshua, 2013:276). The suggestion made in this regards 
are as follows:
 
There is need for the government to 
revisit the issue of citizenship and come up with a 
position that will bring about better integration of the 
various ethnic groups in the polity.
 
The government and the two religions 
(Christianity and Islam) often in conflict should create a 
forum that will promote inter-faith tolerance in Nigeria 
and Plateau State in particular.
 
Politicians should be re-orientated towards 
shunning divisive politics and also see the various ethnic 
groups in the various areas of their jurisdictions as one 
so as to foster peace.
 
The Hausa/Fulani should be educated on the 
simple logic that what they would not permit in their 
home state(s) they should not canvass for in their host 
state(s). In other words, if they (Hausa/Fulani) will not 
allow any non-indigenes to claim ownership in their 
home states they should not ask for the same privilege 
in their host states. 
 
Government should embark on mass 
employment of youth so that they will no longer be ready 
tools in the hands of desperate politicians or religious 
zealots.   
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